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Abstract. Earnings management practice has received much consideration and interest 
from regulators and practitioners as well as academics, with literature in the accounting 
field providing three key approaches for the identification of the various practice levels 
and techniques, including aggregate accruals, specific accruals and statistical 
distribution approach. Despite the fact that many studies have been directed towards 
enhancing the overall power and specification of each approach, there are nevertheless 
pros and cons linked with the application of each model. This paper provides and reviews 
the literature available on the development and assessment of such frameworks in an 
attempt to emphasis the various points studies should be considering when identifying 
earnings management. 
Key Words: earnings management, measurement of earnings management, aggregate 
accruals approach, specific accruals approach statistical, distribution 
approach. 
INTRODUCTION 
The concept of earnings management has received much consideration and interest 
from regulators and practitioners in the field, with the literature referring to this practice 
through the use of various terms, including accounting manipulation, aggressive 
accounting, creative accounting, earnings management, and income smoothing (Stlowy and 
Breton, 2004; Atik 2009). Earnings management occurs when management direct their 
judgment and utilize estimated permitted by accounting standards or structure transactions 
in order to amend financial reports with the aim of misleading stakeholders in regard to 
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the firm's economic performance, or otherwise to impact contractual outcomes that rest on 
the accounting figures reported (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). Such a practice does not 
commonly go against any accounting standards (Marai and Pavlović, 2013). 
Despite the commonly held view that earnings management is prevalence practice 
within the companies, it remains that it has been remarkably difficult for researchers to 
document such a practice (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). Such a difficulty arises mainly owing 
to the fact that earnings management is unobservable, meaning its magnitude cannot be 
measured directly. Accordingly, for researchers to establish whether or not earnings have 
undergone management there is a need for earnings to be estimated prior to earnings 
management effects being seen. 
The second issue is the fact that earnings management may be carried out through a 
number of different techniques, which causes difficulties in terms of establishing 
precisely which techniques have been utilized in order to amend the earnings reported. 
Since earnings are the sum of cash flow and accruals, earning can be manipulated through 
the use of accruals and/or operating cash flow, as highlighted by (Xu, Taylor and Dugan, 
2007). The use of accruals for earnings management is referred to as accounting-based 
earnings management, which encompasses the use of judgments or estimates permitted by 
accounting standards, namely through salvaging values of long-term assets and expected 
lives, deferred taxes, losses from asset impairments and bad debt, obligations for pension 
benefits and other post-employment benefits; the management of through operating cash 
flow is referred to as real earnings management, which encompasses changes in production, 
debt–equity swaps, discretionary expenditures and the reduction of prices (Xu, Taylor and 
Dugan, 2007) . 
When reviewing the accounting literature, three different study designs are recognized 
as widely used in identifying earnings management, namely aggregate accruals, specific 
accruals and the statistic distribution of earnings, as recognized by McNichols (2000). 
Despite the fact that all of these methods are centered on various ideas and assumptions 
to provide a solution to the previously highlighted problems, there is no sole technique 
with the ability to completely answer the mean questions in relation to magnitude, and 
the techniques of earnings management. This paper has the aim of presenting and 
discussing the estimating methods and the assumptions developed by each of the 
approach in regard to dealing with previous problems. Moreover, it also seeks to emphasize 
some of the points needing to be taken into account by researches when selecting the most 
suitable amongst the research designs available. This discussion is centered on 
introducing and reviewing the literature in terms of how each approach has developed 
and is assessed.  
1. AGGREGATE ACCRUALS APPROACH  
This method is essentially centered on two assumptions, the first of which is concerned 
with overcoming the problem that arises from techniques that managers can use to alter 
reported earnings. In this way, the assumption is made that accruals give management the 
ability and resources to manage reported earnings in comparison with cash earnings, which 
are less likely to be managed owing to the difficulties associated with their manipulation. 
As has been mentioned by Paul M. Healy (1985), managers exercise discretion over 
discretionary accrual only. The second assumption underpinning this method is that total 
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accruals are elements of non-discretionary and discretionary, the former of which represents 
the choices made by the management to alter reported earnings. Accordingly, the 
common starting point for the measurement of earnings management is the calculation of 
total accruals. Subsequently, a certain framework is utilised for the estimation of the non-
discretionary element of total accruals, facilitating total accruals to be decomposed into a 
non-discretionary and discretionary component (Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney, 1995). 
In an attempt to break down total accruals into discretionary accrual and non-discretionary 
accrual elements, a number of different models have been devised by researchers, ranging 
from the more simple ones in which total accruals are utilized as an alternative for 
discretionary accruals, and subsequently spanning to the more complex, where regression 
analysis is utilized in order to do so. The literature review of the models adopted most 
commonly will be discussed in this subsection.  
Healy (1985) 
The study of Healy (1985) is the first to have presented total accruals as a measure for 
earnings management. Through this study, he suggests that total accruals encompass non-
discretionary and discretionary accrual aspects, but ultimately does not provide a 
distinction between discretionary accruals and non-discretionary accruals; rather, the 
assumption is made that total accruals are equal to non-discretionary accruals when there 
is no presence of earnings management. This suggests that total accruals are equal to non-
discretionary accruals, with both representing earnings prior to the impact of earnings 
management during the period of estimation, which may be presented symbolically as 
highlighted below: 
      
∑    
 
 
NDA: estimating discretionary accruals for the firm I in a given time t. 
TA: total accruals, defined as the difference between reported earnings and operating 
cash flows.  
T= 1, 2…. T is a year subscript for the years included in the estimation period; and  
 = a year subscript indicating a year in the event period.  
DeAngelo (1986) 
In much the same way as Healy (1985), DeAngelo (1986) implements total accruals 
as a proxy for earnings management, with a definition of total accruals as the difference 
between operating cash flows and net income. She further emphasizes that TA (total 
accruals) encompass both NDA (non-discretionary) and DA (discretionary) elements. In 
contrast, however, the model presented by Healy was criticized by DeAngelo in the sense 
that, if NDA is considered to be too large in comparison to TA, the latter measure would 
then be considered a poor alternative for the degree of earnings management in period 
t=1, and thus, for her research, NDA may be considered too significant and systematically 
negative for a large number of organizations—even those lacking in systematic manipulation. 
In this way, an empirical observation has been made that TA<0 has the ability to create 
an erroneous inference that management had intentionally understated earnings, when the 
more precise explanation is that total accruals commonly comprise a (material) negative 
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non-discretionary elements. As a substitute, a non-zero benchmark was developed for the 
''normal'' or expected total accrual in periods before the management buyout. For this 
reason, the total accrual in the immediately prior period is taken as a benchmark for what 
the current accrual would be without income manipulation. 
More specifically, DeAngelo (1986) examined whether or not the 'abnormal' total 
accrual's average value is notably negative for the sample firms in periods before the 
buyout (Jones, 1991). This particular average is calculated as described as follows: 
(         )  (         )  (           ). This model and the implications 
of such are interpreted by DeAngelo as proof of a systematic earnings understatement. 
Such a view relies on the assumption that the general change in non-discretionary 
accruals (           ) is approximately zero, where a notable average decrease in 
total accruals (   -   - ) mainly represents a notable average decrease in discretionary 
accruals  (         ). 
Jones (1991) 
The study by Jones is the first to have presented the model where total accrual changes 
may be predicted through the use of explanatory variables. It has been observed that total 
accrual changes are likely to arise in some way from the organization's economic position 
(non-discretionary accruals), meaning that total accrual changes may be the outcome 
stemming from earnings without manipulation. For instance, if non-discretionary accruals 
are a function of revenue, the negative changes witnessed through the accruals may be 
owing to the non-discretionary changes as opposed to the discretionary accruals. 
In contrast, the researcher also takes into account the fact that total accrual changes 
may result from discretionary accrual changes; in this instance, this is earnings management. 
Accordingly, in an attempt to control the impacts of economic circumstances in regard to 
total accruals—otherwise stated the non-discretionary accrual changes in total accruals—
the expectation model detailed below may be utilised. 
    
      
       [
 
     
]      [
      
     
]       [
     
     
]        
Total Accruals = Non-Discretionary Accruals + Discretionary Accruals  
where:  
     = total accruals in year t for firm i; 
      = revenues in year t less revenues in year t-1 for firm i;  
      = Gross property, plant, and equipment in year t for firm i; 
     = error term in year t for firm i; 
I =1…. N, firm index; 
T= 1… Ti, year index for the years included in the estimation period for firm I (it ranges 
between 14-23 years).  
As can be seen in above equation, the calculation of total accruals may be performed 
as following: The change in non-cash working capital before income taxes payable less 
total depreciation expense. Gross property, plant, and equipment and change in revenues 
are included in the expectations model to control for changes in nondiscretionary accruals 
induced by changing conditions. Revenues are utilised with the aim of controlling for the 
organisation's economic setting owing to the fact that they are an objective measure of the 
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operations of the firm prior to the manipulations induced by management, although notably 
they are not entirely exogenous. All of the elements encompassed within the accruals 
expectations model are scaled by lagged assets in order to decrease heteroscedasticity. 
Through the utilisation of the longest time series of observations available before Year 1 for 
all firms and the ordinary least squares, the estimation was made by Jones of α1, b1, and b2; 
of αi, β1i, and β2i, respectively. Following the estimation of the parameters outlined in the 
equation above, these will be incorporated within the following model with the aim of 
assessing the prediction error in the event period, which represents earnings management in 
the prediction (event) period. In line with the assumption that the link between the explanatory 
and non-discretionary accruals is stationary, the following outlines the prediction error: 
        
    
      
  (   *
 
     
+      *
      
     
+       *
     
     
+) 
Discretionary Accruals = Total Accruals - Non-Discretionary Accruals   
where: 
    = The prediction error. 
The P = year index for the years included in the prediction period.  
The prediction error (µip) signifies the degree of discretionary accruals in firm I at time p 
(prediction period) and subsequently demonstrates the earnings management of the firm 
at time p. 
Dechow et al. (1995) 
The overall performance of previous accruals-based models, such as those by Healy 
(1995), DeAngelo (1986), Dechow and Sloan (1991) and Jones (1991), is assessed by 
Dechow et al. (1995) with the aim of drawing a comparison between these and the new 
amended version by Jones. Consideration is directed towards the As can be seen in above 
equation modified version, with the view held that the standard Jones specification may 
be taken as being unable to capture the effects of sales-based manipulation owing to the 
fact that sales changes are recognised as giving rise to non-discretionary accruals. 
Accordingly, the new version has been developed with the aim of eradicating the conjectured 
tendency of the Jones model so as to ensure the discretionary accruals with error can be 
measured when discretion is exercised over revenues. In the newer version, non-discretionary 
accruals are predicted throughout the period of the event, i.e. during the times for which there 
is the hypothesis of earnings management, as following (Dechow et al., 1995): 
        (
 
    
)     (           )     (    ) 
where:  
      = net receivables in year τ less net receivables in year τ-1 scaled by total assets at τ-1. 
The estimates of α1, α2, α3 and non-discretionary accruals throughout the period of 
estimation (during which there is no systematic earnings management hypothesis) are those 
gathered through the original model presented by Jones. The only change relative to the 
first model of Jones is that revenue changes are amended in line with the change in 
receivables during the period of event. The preliminary model directly suggests that 
discretion is not adopted in regard to revenue through either the event or estimation period. 
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The modified version makes the direct assumption that all credit sales changes during 
the event period are an outcome of earnings management owing to the fact that earnings are 
managed more easily through exercising discretion over the acknowledgment of credit sales 
revenue than through exercising discretion over the cash sales revenue. If such changes are 
recognised as successful, the earnings management predictions should then be unbiased in 
the case of those samples where earnings management has been implemented through 
revenue management.  
Peasnell, Pope and Young (2000) 
Peasnell et al. (2000) have provided a different cross-sectional model centred on 
predicting unusual accruals, referred to as the margin model. Comparable to the original 
model presented by Jones, as well as the modified version, a two-stage approach is utilised 
in order to predict unusual accruals. The primary phase comprises the regression of 
accounting accruals on a course of explanatory variables aimed to capture those accruals that 
have not been managed. Unlike the two previous models, deferent explanatory variables are 
included within the first-phase regression, which are taken from a formal framework that 
provides a link between accruals, earnings and sales. A further deferent from other 
models is the application of WCA (working capital accruals) as opposed to TA (total 
accruals), as well as the exclusion of depreciation from the margin model. As has been 
discussed through the work of (Peasnell et al., 2000), the justification behind the exclusion 
of depreciation from accruals measure is the fact that such an item is an inadequate 
instrument in systematic earnings management. Furthermore, appropriate tool for such 
estimation is modelling change in working capital accruals through three key aspects, 
namely creditors (∆CREDIT), debtors net of bad debt allowance (∆DEBT) and stocks 
(∆STOCK), each of which may be further described below (Peasnell et al., 2000): 
 ∆STOCK = PUR  COGS  (1) 
 ∆DEBT = REVC  CRC  BDE  (2) 
 ∆CREDIT =PUR  CPS  (3) 
Where PUR is purchases of materials, COGS is cost of finished goods sold, REVC is 
revenue from credit sales, CRC is cash received from customers, BDE is the bad debt 
expense, and CPS is cash paid to suppliers. It should be acknowledged that, although ∆ 
STOCK in (1) encompasses inventories of materials, works-in-progress and completed 
goods, all intermediate transfers between such inventory categories involve the cancelling 
of entries that can be ignored when inventories are aggregated. 
The second aspect is a modeling WCA, as shown below: 
WCA = (∆STOCK=∆DEBT) -∆CREDIT +OTHER =  
(REVC COGS  BDE ) + (CPS CRC ) + OTHER 
 =sm.REVC –cm.CRC +OTHER  (4) 
where sm equals the gross margin on recorded sales, cm equals the gross cash contribution 
on cash collections from customers, and OTHER includes all non-cash current assets 
besides stocks and trade debtors, and all current liabilities besides creditors. The postulation 
is made that OTHER is orthogonal to REVC and CRC in equation (4). The aim is that 
equation (4) establishes accrual recognition prior to being impacted through earnings 
management. Working capital is communicated as the total of two contributory margins, 
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namely the margin on cash received, referred to as the 'cash margin', and the gross margin 
on its cash flow analogue and sales.  
Through the application of this method, working capital accruals that are not established 
through sales and cash collections throughout the specified time are recognised as 
'abnormal', and therefore are recognised as being the most probable to manifest (discretionary 
accruals) earnings management.  
Equation (4) is utilised on an empirical basis through the application of the OLS 
regression tool, with Peasnell et al. (2000) also examining the ability to identify accrual 
management by adopting a cross-sectional prediction approach; the academics suggest 
that a greater ability to identify systematic earnings management can be seen through a 
working capital accrual measure when compared with a total accruals measure. When 
drawing a comparison between the models by Jones and the modified Jones version, and 
their own margin model, it was established that the modified version of Jones is more 
capable of identifying revenue-based manipulation, whilst the margin model is more 
capable of highlighting non-bad debt expense manipulations.  
Kothari et al. (2005) 
Kothari, Leone and Wasley (2005) presented a new model centred on identifying 
earnings management, with the model referred to as Performance Matching. The scholars 
also drew a comparison between the model efficiency in contrast with the regression-
based approach, more specifically the original and amended models of Jones. In much the 
same way as the Jones model, this model utilises residuals from the annual cross-sectional 
industry regression, although there are two main differences: the first is the fact that it 
comprises return on assets, which is used to control for organisational performance; the 
second involves the use of a constant, which provides a greater degree of control in terms of 
heteroskedasticity, and it further elementals the issues associated with an omitted scale 
variable and allows the discretionary measure to be more symmetric. The model is seen as 
follows (Kothari et al., 2005):  
            (
 
          
)                                 (        )       
where      = total accruals predicted as the change in non-cash current assets minus the 
change in current liabilities excluding the current portion of long-term debt, minus 
depreciation and amortization, scaled by lagged total assets. 
         = change in sales scaled by lagged total assets. 
        -  = total assets  
      = net property, plant and equipment scaled by ASSETSit-1. 
     (      - ) = return on assets  
Dechow et al., 2012 
Dechow et al. (2012) introduce a new method for detecting accrual-based earnings 
management, with this method built on the assumption that, in any period, accrual-based 
earnings management would reverse during another period. Furthermore, the view is also 
claimed by the scholars that, if the academics have priors in regard to the reversal timing, 
encompassing such priors could ultimately enhance the ability and the criteria of tests in 
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the context of earnings management. Their findings suggest that the involvement of reversals 
could enhance test power by as much as 40%, and may also deliver a sound approach to 
avoiding model misspecifications that stem from related omitted variables. In some regard, 
this approach depends on the previous models to decompose accruals into non-discretionary 
and discretionary elements; on the other hand, however, they also encompass earnings 
management reversals within these models and analyse improvements. Nevertheless, there 
has been some criticism directed towards this model in regard to its failure to highlight the 
way in which the investigator can establish or outline priors for the periods during which 
there has been the occurrence and reversal of accruals-based earnings management. Rather, 
their method adopts the view that the scholar recognises the periods during which there will 
be the occurrence and reversal of earnings management (Gerakos, 2012). 
2. SPECIFIC ACCRUALS APPROACH  
In contrast with the total accruals models, one key element of this approach is 
modelling particular accruals' behaviours in an attempt to identify its non-discretionary and 
discretionary aspects. This method commonly directs attention towards a particular sector 
environment where an individual accrual is sizeable and demands significant judgement. It 
determines earnings management from examining management discretions through an 
individual accrual account, namely the claim loss reserve, for example, which is a very 
material accrual for the insurance sector. Moreover, loan provisions are a particular accrual 
requiring significant judgement within the banking arena, or bad debt provision and 
depreciation predictions in an alternative setting. In line with such elements, in addition to 
subjective proof, the investigators may consider that, through a specific accrual or set of 
accruals, management discretion may be reflected. The section following provides a prior 
literature linked with this method.  
McNichols and Wilson (1988) 
The research by McNichols and Wilson is the first to utilise the specific accruals 
model to analyse whether or not management manage earnings, with attention directed 
towards a single accrual, namely bad debts provision, as opposed to a number of accruals. 
Moreover, it also implements the GAAP framework in order to examine the way in 
which a specific accounting number, bad debts provision, would be seen when there is a 
lack of earnings management. In actuality, the research utilises the residual provision for 
bad debts as proxy for earnings management. In order to calculate this residual, the 
authors model the expected provision for bad debt as a linear function of the beginning 
balance in the allowance for bad debts and the magnitude of current and next year's write 
offs. Through ensuring the control of such elements, the view is made that their method 
removes the non-discretionary aspects of bad debts expense, and thus gathers a bad debt 
provision, which mainly highlights accounting discretion amongst management. 
Accordingly, the model is as follows (McNichols & Wilson, 1988): 
Prov t = α0 + α1 BgBl t + α2 Write-off t + α3 Write-off t+1 + resprov t 
where:  
Prov t: the provision for bad debts, deflated by period t sales  
BgBl t: the beginning balance of allowance for bad debts in period t, deflated by period t sales.  
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Write-off t: write-offs for period t, deflated by period t sales.  
Write-off t+1: write-offs for period t +1, deflated by period t sales.  
resprov t: the projection error, which by design is orthogonal to the repressors. 
It can be seen that this model is similar to total accruals models in terms of decomposing 
total accruals into managed and unmanaged components. To do so it uses regression model. 
Beneish (1997) 
Beneish (1997) introduces a model centred on identifying earnings management from 
organisations dealing with significant financial performance, and examines actual earnings 
management occurrences, contrasting the performance of the model to that of the aggregate 
accrual approaches, particularly the modified Jones by Dechow et al. (1995). The method 
establishes a distinction between GAAP violators and aggressive accruals, and is centred 
on the explanatory variables able to capture and differentiate between elements that establish 
incentives to violate, and the likelihood of identifying GAAP violation. Moreover, they 
utilise a number of different possible variables that establish incentives to violate GAPP, 
and further take into account another eight financial statement variables, which could impact 
the overall likelihood of being identified by the market participants, with such variables 
capturing misrepresentations in financial data, as derived through GAAP violation. This 
delivers a probability prediction of the potential for earnings management between 
organisations in which abnormal accruals are not correctly outlined. The model is detailed 
as follows: 
Mi = Bxi + ϴ 
where: 
M: a dichotomous variable which takes a value of I for violators and 0 otherwise. 
X: the matrix of explanatory variables. 
ϴ: a vector of mean zero independent and identically normally distributed residuals. 
As such, Beneish (1997) highlights that the capacity of the modified Jones model to 
separate discretion among firms with significant performance may be improved through 
incorporating lagged total accruals and a tool for measuring past price performance as 
explanatory. Such additional variables are in line with the estimation made by Guay, 
Kothari and Watts (1996), who suggest that accruals models that consider the incentives 
of management and who acknowledge the reversals of discretionary accruals are more 
likely to detect discretionary accruals. 
Cecchini, Jackson and Liu (2012) 
The study of Cecchini et al. (2012) examines whether or not the IPO (initial public 
offering) organisations manage earnings through the application of an individual accrual 
account on the balance sheet and an individual accrual account on the income statement, 
notably the allowance for uncollectible accounts and bad debt expense, respectively. 
Comparable to the approach of Teoh, Wong and Rao (1998), the writers begin through 
drawing a comparison with the scaled allowance of non-IPO organisations to the scaled 
allowance of IPO organisations, where the scaled allowances receivables are introduced 
in terms of percentage form              . 
Where:       is the allowance for uncollectible accounts. 
      is a gross accounts receivable, i and t are firm and year subscript 
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The study of Cecchini et al. (2012) further develops such an analysis by placing 
emphasis on the ratio of the receivables allowance to leading write-offs. The ratio is 
expressed through the percentage               
where:        the allowance for uncollectible accounts. 
      Write-offs of uncollectible accounts, i and t are firm and year subscript.  
Making the assumption that leading write-offs is mainly linked with the receivables 
allowance in year t, the ratio of 1 should suggest that the allowance is precisely adequate. 
Ratios seen to be more than 1 would suggest that the organisation has exaggerated its 
allowance, whereas the organisation may have understated its allowance if the ratio is 
much below 1. In terms of the examinations of bad debt expense, the work of Cecchini et 
al. (2012) examined the differences in the scaled bad debt expense between IPO firms 
and matched non-IPO firms through the application of scales as a scaling variable. This 
can be illustrated in the following way:                . 
where        is the bad debt expense         is the net sales and i and t are firm and year 
subscript. 
The findings suggest that there is no notable difference when comparing the non-IPO 
and the IPO organisations. This finding somewhat challenges the view those IPO 
businesses understate their receivables-related accrual accounts. Moreover, Cecchini et 
al. (2012) apply the model presented by McNichols and Wilson (1988) with the aim to 
examine whether or not bad debt expense is seen to be much different between non-IPO 
and matched IPO organisations following the controlling for economic determinants of 
bad debt expense. This model is detailed as shown below: 
     
      
        
       
      
   
    
      
   
      
      
             
where:      ,        ,         and     , are defined above;       is an indicator 
variable coded as 1 for IPO firms and 0 otherwise. 
The coefficient on 
       
      
 can be communicated as negative, where the coefficients on 
    
      
 and 
      
      
 are expected to be positive. Markedly, a positive coefficient on        
suggests that IPO organisations detail greater bad debt expenses than matched non-IPO 
firms, whilst a negative coefficient on       suggests that IPO organisations detail more 
minor bad debt expense than matched non-IPO organisations.   
3. STATISTICAL DISTRIBUTION APPROACH 
This method is centred on the assumption that management commonly have incentives 
driving them to satisfy particular benchmarks and goals; thus, earnings distribution 
encompasses lesser observations than expected just below the threshold, with more observations 
than expected above the threshold. Upon the analysis of the frequency and dissemination 
of reported earnings surrounding such thresholds, distribution discontinuities may be 
observed. Importantly, if the distribution is balanced, no earnings management is adopted; on 
the other hand, however, if earnings are recognised at a particular benchmark or at 0, earnings 
management may have been implemented. Nevertheless, earnings distribution in itself is 
not adequate; there needs to be particular thresholds that seek out and establish the 
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discontinuity apparent at such thresholds. The following section considers the most 
commonly cited researches linked with this method.  
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) 
The study of Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) delivers the first cross-sectional distribution 
method in order to analyse whether, why and how organisations achieve earnings management. 
This study establishes three thresholds that drive the manipulation of earnings. These are: to 
avoid reporting earnings decreases, to maintain positive earnings and to avoid losses. This 
research centres on the view that earnings management with the aim of avoiding decreases in 
earnings is likely to be highlighted through cross-sectional distributions of earnings changes. 
Such distribution takes the form of uncommonly high frequencies of minor earnings increases 
and uncommonly low frequencies of minor earning decreases. In much the same way, 
earnings manipulation to avoid losses will be highlighted through the form of unusual high 
frequencies of minor positive earnings and unusual low frequencies of minor losses. 
With the aim of examining this assumption, two different forms of evidence are utilised, 
the first of which is graphical through the adoption of histograms in order to epitomise 
the pooled cross-sectional earnings data gathered, and to further emphasise the changes in 
earnings around zero and the lack of continuity of earnings; the second test is statistical in 
nature, and adopts the assumption that, within the null hypothesis of no earnings management, 
it is considered that there would be a smooth cross-sectional dissemination of earnings 
changes and earnings levels. From an operational standpoint, smoothness, in this context, is 
described as being the number of observations expected during any distribution period. This 
expected number is collocated as the average of the numerous observations in the two 
intervals immediately closest.  
Degeorge et al. (1999) 
Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser (1999) presented a method centred on behavioural 
thresholds for earnings management; with this particular model demonstrating the way in 
which efforts to surpass thresholds create certain earnings management patterns. The 
process begins with the establishment of three thresholds, each of which is considered a 
probable earnings management driver. The first of these is centred on reporting profits, 
which stems from the psychological value recognised in terms of the distinction between 
negative and positive results. The second is maintaining recent performance; in other words, 
to earn at least the same as the previous year. The third is to meet the expectations of analysts, 
especially the consensus of analysts in their earnings predictions.  
Such thresholds are recognised as fundamental for management owing to the fact that 
the parties in question, along with the organisation, also view them as valuable. The model 
assumes that executives perform earnings management with the aim of impacting the views 
of outsiders, including banks, investors and suppliers, with the aim of deriving personal 
satisfaction from making a target. At the same time, outsiders make use of thresholds as a 
way of rewards and assessing executives; in this regard, upon the response of executives to 
such thresholds, reported earnings distribution becomes unclear. Essentially, too many 
earnings fall above the threshold whilst too few fall below. The assumption is also made 
that, when earnings are recognised as being within an unacceptable range, upwards management 
incentives are notable. Furthermore, if bonus plans limits are exceeded by earnings, limits 
will be moved, thus meaning future limits will be easier to achieve.  
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Gore et al. (2007) 
The study of Gore, Pope and Singh (2007) adds additional value to the literature in two 
key ways. Primarily, it examines a wide-ranging non-American dataset, which has not been 
done before, thus validating the belief that those discontinuities reported in the literature 
previously are not particular to the US environment. Secondly, it further presents 
innovative tests, providing further support to the idea that the discontinuities in the 
distribution of earnings are linked with accruals centred on earnings management within 
their particular sample. Moreover, it also examines the links and associations between 
working capital accrual discretionary components, earnings target achievement frequency 
and the discontinuity observed in the distribution of earnings alongside basic targets. The 
scholars also implemented an in-depth assessment of earnings management in regard to 
earnings thresholds with the use of a significant sample of organisations in the United 
Kingdom. Emphasis was placed on earnings management with the inclusion of working 
capital accruals manipulation. Evidence was detailed as being consistent with earnings 
management with the aim of achieving goals. More specifically, they highlight that earnings 
adjustment for discretionary accruals eradicates earnings target discontinuity.  
4. DISCUSSION OF DEVELOPING AND EVALUATING THE DIFFERENT APPROACHES  
Despite the fact that all discretionary accruals models share the common concept—
utilising non-discretionary accruals as a measure for earnings management—it remains 
that there are fundamental differences between the models. Particularly in regard to 
separating the non-discretionary accruals aspect from the total accruals, and their capacity 
to deal with changes in organisations' economic circumstances, in addition to the power 
and specification of each model. The models provided by Healy (1985) and DeAngelo 
(1986) hold the assumption that there is stability amongst non-discretionary accruals, 
with such limits recognised as unrealistic owing to the fact that accounting accruals 
experience change in line with the economic environment (Kaplan, 1985, cited by Dechow 
et al., 2012). As a substitute to the model provided by Jones (1991), the amended version by 
Dechow et al. (1995), in addition to the performance-adjusted discretionary accruals presented 
by Kothari et al. (2005), the variations of non-discretionary accruals are controlled through 
consideration to the changes in total assets, receivables and revenues, in addition to the 
performance of the organization (e.g. return on assets).  
In terms of the power and specification of all models, the original and modified 
version of the model of Jones are acknowledged throughout the literature as being the 
most capable tools in terms of identifying earnings management (Dechow et al., 1995; 
Young, 1999). A number of researches conducted recently provided a comparison of the 
performance of alternative total accruals models in identifying earnings management. For 
instance, Dechow et al. (1995) and Guay et al. (1996) assess the overall performance of 
five deferent models with the aim of measuring discretionary accruals, in particular those 
of  Healy (1985), DeAngelo (1986), Jones (1991) and Dechow & Sloan (1991), as well as 
the model suggested in their research—the amended Jones model. The findings suggest 
that the amended Jones model displays the greatest ability in terms of testing earnings 
management. Moreover, literature published previously, such as the works of Subramanyam 
(1996) and Peasnell et al. (2000) all emphasise highlight the superiority associated with 
adopting the Jones model in regard to cross-sectional data over their time-series counterparts. 
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This is owing to the fact that the former decreases time effect issues and creates a larger 
sample, thus inducing a greater coefficients estimate.  
The main benefit associated with this method is its capacity to capture the scale of 
earnings management; in contrast, however, it is not able to highlight the accounts 
utilised by management. One further matter for consideration is the aggregate accruals 
models, which utilises residuals in order to calculate the discretionary accruals. In the 
time-series scenario it is recognised that residuals use is suitable, measuring the difference 
between abnormal and normal accruals throughout the estimation and event periods, 
respectively; on cross-sectional settings, on the other hand, this is not the same case. In 
theory, residuals should average zero, thus meaning that the model's specifications are 
significantly queried when measuring discretionary accruals.  
In relation to specific accruals methods, seeking to identify earnings management 
through the use of single accruals can be both beneficial and disadvantageous, with three 
pros and cons highlighted by McNichols (2000) as linked with this particular accruals 
approach. The main benefit is, firstly, the fact that intuition may be used by the researcher 
for the main elements impacting the accrual behaviour, with knowledge of generally 
accepted accounting principles exploited; secondly, a particular accrual method may be 
adopted across those sectors where business practices cause the accrual to be a likely 
object of discretion and judgment; and thirdly, the direct estimation of the link between 
the explanatory factors and single accrual factors.  
In contrast, there are three key drawbacks: primarily, there may be the identification 
of earnings management within a single accrual approach, but only if the accruals under 
analysis are managed, thus meaning there are problems associated with establishing those 
accruals utilised for earnings management. Importantly, even if the most suitable accrual 
is analysed, the impacts of managing an accrual alone may not be significant enough to 
achieve statistical significance. It is claimed by McNichols and Wilson (1988) that, upon 
specific accruals representing a small aspect of the discretionary component, they may 
not be successful in highlighting earnings management in instances where other discretionary 
elements have been manipulated. In this way, the aggregate accruals models may introduce a 
more in-depth study design when capturing the discretionary elements. Secondly, it is 
reasonable to suggest that management utilises more than one accrual during the process of 
earnings management; therefore, although the single accrual approach is efficient in 
terms of identifying the management of earnings in some cases, earnings management in 
most situations cannot be identified (McNichols and Wilson, 1988). Thirdly, the numerous 
organisations for which a particular accrual is managed could have a small relative to the 
number of organizations with aggregate accruals, which could ultimately restrict the 
generality and understanding of the results concerning particular accruals researches.  
Regarding the distribution approach, it is key feature is being relatively simple to use, 
and it is a graphical description of the earnings after the alteration of reported earnings 
has accrued. In addition, this approach detects earnings management while avoiding the 
issue of measurement error and misspecification resulting from accrual-based earnings 
management models (Sun and Rath, 2010). McNichols (2000) stats that the distribution 
models are powerful in earnings management investigations, because they provide the 
researchers with a strong prediction based in the frequency of earnings realizations rather 
than the estimation of the discretionary accrual. Moreover, it is considered a suitable 
powerful method for measuring earnings management when an enormous number of 
firms sceptic to be managing earnings. However, the results of empirical studies that 
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question the shapes of earnings distributions as evidence for absence / presence of 
earnings management do not support the assumption that earnings management can be 
completely explained by the discontinuity of the earnings distribution. For example, 
Dechow, Richardson and Tuna (2003) do not find an association between discretionary 
operating accruals and the earnings discontinuity. Also Durtschi and Easton (2005) 
provide results that should be taken in consideration when using the shapes of the frequency 
distributions of earnings as indicator for earnings management practices. They show that 
these shapes can be affected by deflation, sample selection, and a difference between the 
characteristics of profit and loss observations (such as market pricing and analyst 
optimism/pessimism). The same findings established by Beaver, McNichols and Nelson 
(2007), Durtschi and Easton (2009) who emphasize that researchers should consider evidence 
beyond the shapes of distribution and should be caution when interpreting a discontinuity in 
the distribution of earnings as indicator for earnings management. In contrary to these studies 
which questioned distribution approach for earnings management measurement, Jacob 
and Jorgensen (2007) reexamine the findings of Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and support 
the findings in Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) and indicate that these findings are not induced 
by scaling. Above of all, it can be seen that this approach can indicate earnings 
management practice existence but delivers no insight into the techniques or magnitude of 
earnings management.  
Overall, the various methods available for identifying the management of earnings are 
numerous, with the benefits of all methods seemingly reliant on their overall capability in 
terms of measuring earnings management level and methods. Accordingly, establishing which 
method is most suitable ultimately rests on the aim of the study: if the study is concerned with 
analysing the degree of earnings management with lesser attention directed towards the 
approaches, the aggregate method would be viewed as most suitable. The specific 
accruals approach is more suitable if the objective is to test whether particular approaches 
have been adopted in order to manage earnings; however, the results of particular 
accruals can be problematic to generalise when particular accruals are not very sensitive. 
In contrast, the method of distribution frequency is valuable when testing for the present 
management of earnings, although it is not able to detect the degree or the instruments 
associated with the changes in the earnings reported.  
CONCLUSION 
The measurement of earnings management is a common consideration amongst 
professionals and academics in the field; however, owing to the fact that these practices 
cannot be observed directly, as well as the numerous methods management adopt in its 
application, identification is problematic. Accounting literature does provide a number of 
different approaches for the measurement of earnings management; however, their abilities 
remain questionable, with all methods comprising benefits and drawbacks in comparison 
to others, which need to be acknowledged by academics when identifying earnings 
management. In actuality, the pros and cons of all methods ultimately depend on their ability 
to measure the level and instruments of amending the earnings reported. Furthermore, 
aggregate accruals approach are recognised as being the most widely utilised and capable, 
particularly the original devised by Jones, the subsequent modified model of Jones, and 
the performance model. The ability is derived from its capacity to control organisational 
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performance when separating total accruals into non-discretionary and discretionary 
accruals, and subsequently utilising the former as a proxy for earnings management. 
Researchers should consider such approaches, which are able to highlight the level of 
earnings management without detailing the approaches applied. The specific accruals 
method is not only able to measure the management of earnings in regard to the level, but 
also has the ability to identify the tools implemented. Nevertheless, the results of such a 
method are problematic in terms of generalisation when particular accruals are not 
adequately sensitive. In relation to the frequency distribution method, this can be adopted 
simply and avoids measurement error that can arise with the implementation of different 
methods. Nevertheless, it may be utilised with the aim of identifying whether or not there 
is the presence of earnings management, but delivers no insight into the instruments or 
magnitude of earnings management.  
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PRIKAZ PRISTUPA IDENTIFIKOVANJA NIVOA UPRAVLJANJA 
DOBITKOM: RAZVOJ I EVALUACIJA 
Praksa upravljanja dobitkom izazvala je značajnu pažnju te postala predmet interesovanja 
regulatornih tela, praktičara i naučne javnosti. U literaturi iz oblasti računovodstva, navode se tri 
ključna pristupa za identifikovanje nivoa i tehnika upravljanja dobitkom. U pitanju su pristup zasnovan 
na ukupnoj razlici između operativnog cash flow-a i dobitka, pristup zasnovan na specifičnim razlikama i 
statistički pristup zasnovan na distribuciji raspodela. Uprkos činjenici da su brojna istraživanja 
usmerena ka poboljšanju svakog od navedenih pristupa, ograničenja su i dalje prisutna, te svaki pristup 
ima svoje prednosti i slabosti. U radu je dat kritički osvrt metoda za ocenu nivoa upravljanja dobitkom 
prisutnih u literaturi, uključujući i prikaz razvoja ovih metoda, uz naglašavanje prednosti i ograničenja 
koje je u istraživanjima usmerenih ka identifikovanju upravljanja dobitkom potrebno uzeti u obzir.  
Ključne reči: upravljanje dobitkom, kvantifikovanje upravljanja dobitkom, pristup zasnovan na 
razlici između cash flow-a i dobitka, disruptivni pristup, pristup zasnovan na 
distribuciji raspodela. 
